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This thesis empirically examines the determinants of the entrepreneur's political 
participation by employing a unique matched firm-institution dataset from China. 
Due to the underdevelopment of markets and market-supporting institutions in 
transition countries, entrepreneurs may rely on alternative institutions to do business. 
Besides going underground, relational contracting and government ownership of firms 
in response to this state/market failure, political participation of private entrepreneurs 
in China presents another kind of entrepreneurial response that helps overcome the 
lack of well-functioning markets and market-supporting institutions. Our empirical 
analysis shows that the likelihood of an entrepreneur's participation can be explained 
by the underdevelopment of the market and imperfections in market-supporting 
institutions. Our findings support the view that the institutional environment shapes 
the private entrepreneur's motivation to participate in politics; they also provide 
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1 Introduction 
The underdevelopment of markets and market-supporting institutions is a common feature of 
transition economies. Governments in these countries normally possess considerable control 
over the allocation of resources either through their residual power of planning or through 
their control of state-owned enterprises, including banks (Nee, 1992; McMillan, 1997). Be-
cause of the high degree of control exercised by these governments and the imperfections in 
the product and credit markets, private businesses cannot fully rely on the markets to secure 
resources. The same governments may also intervene in private business by frequently im-
posing unnecessary regulations (red tape) and/or very high tax rates (Johnson et al. 2000; 
Guriev, 2004). According to De Soto (1989) and Bmnetti et al. (1997), these regulations 
and taxes have come to impose considerable costs on private firms in transition economies. 
Apart from the weaknesses in state and market institutions, the legal systems in these coun-
tries are also very weak (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). Because laws are either non-existent or 
are not enforceable, entrepreneurs cannot rely on the legal system to secure property rights 
and to enforce contracts (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a; Frye and Zhuravskaia, 2000). 
Because of the lack of market-supporting institutions, private entrepreneurs in these 
countries have to rely on other institutions to do business. Entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe 
and Russia have been observed to go underground to escape over-regulation and high taxes 
(Johnson et al , 1997 and 1998; Friedman et al , 2000). In Vietnam, the courts are incom-
petent, and entrepreneurs there depend heavily on relational contracting in order to lower 
their contract enforcement costs (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a and 1999b). In China, to 
overcome these institutional difficulties, local governments themselves became involved in 
business operations, and this led in the 1980s to the creation of an exceptionally innovative 
government ownership form known as the Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs).i 
Another response to state and market failures, one which has been much overlooked 
in the literature, occurs where entrepreneurs actively participate in politics to overcome the 
lack of well-functioning markets and market-supporting institutions. Or, to put it the other 
^See, eg. Chang and Wang (1994), Li (1996), Che and Qian (1998) and Jin and Qian (1998) for the 
literature on TVEs. 
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way round, entrepreneurs' motivation to participate in politics is shaped by the institutional 
environment in which they operate (Bartels and Brady, 2003). Many entrepreneurs in Russia, 
to defend themselves against "legislation that could raise their taxes, tie them to red tape, or 
threaten their property rights," are vying to secure a seat in the Duma, the popularly elected 
lower house of Russia's legislature. Dmitry Orlov, a political scientist at the Independent 
Center for Political Technologies in Moscow, estimates that one fifth of the Duma's 450 
seats are going to be directly occupied by business people, and twice as many as that (about 
180 positions) could go to business lobbyists representing their clients' interests {Business 
Week, Dec 8, 2003). Likewise, an increasing number of businessmen in Vietnam are running 
for the National Assembly, the country's highest legislative body {Far Eastern Economic 
Review, May 9, 2002). The issues commonly taken up by these entrepreneurs include cutting 
the heavy tax burden and making it easier to start private businesses. Recently, more 
and more members of China's business elite have begun actively participating in politics. 
Many of them have attained membership of the People's Congress (PC) or the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Membership of the PC or CPPCC 
is advantageous to private entrepreneurs not only because it gives them some measure of 
political power, but also because it makes it easier for them to cultivate formal and informal 
ties with important government bureaucrats who are also members of the two organizations. 
Chinese private entrepreneurs who are PC or CPPCC members can obtain resources which 
are not accessible through markets; they can circumvent government regulations; they can 
secure tax deductions and obtain legal or non-legal protection for their businesses.^ 
In this thesis, we examine the determinants of the entrepreneurs' political participation 
by employing a unique matched firm-institution dataset from China. We hypothesize that 
a private entrepreneur is more likely to participate in politics if his/her firm is situated in 
a province where market-supporting institutions are weaker. Employing the multinomial 
logit model, we find that a private entrepreneur is more likely to participate in politics 
where the market is less developed, where the local government has more regulations, where 
^Likewise, in the United States, individuals and interest groups make political campaign contributions in 
anticipation of receiving future "services" in return, which include tax exemptions, alleviation of regulatory 
burdens, etc. See Snyder (1990) for a review of the relevant literature. 
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the informal tax burden is heavier, and where the legal system is weaker. This empirical 
finding supports our conjecture that the institutional background shapes the entrepreneurs' 
motivation to participate in politics. We also find that both the human and political capital 
of entrepreneurs contribute positively to the likelihood of their political participation. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the political partici-
patory behavior of private entrepreneurs in transition countries.3 Unlike other institutional 
responses such as going underground and government ownership, political participation is an 
aggressive response of entrepreneurs to state, market and legal failures in transition coun-
tries. By participating in politics, private entrepreneurs as a whole will have a profound 
impact on the development and implementation of policies and laws in transition countries. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional back-
ground in China. Section 3 proposes several hypotheses pertaining to the determinants of 
political participation. Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 outlines the 
econometric specification. Section 6 empirically tests the hypotheses and reports results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
In this section, we first describe the history of private business in China since its rebirth in 
1978 when the far-reaching economic reform started. In particular, we focus on the institu-
tional environments in which firms have grown in the past two and a half decades. We then 
outline the basic characteristics of the two political bodies in which private entrepreneurs 
have been actively participating, i.e., the People's Congress and the Chinese People's Polit-
ical Consultative Conference. 
2.1 Private Businesses in China since 1978 
Private business regained its legitimacy in 1978, when the state endorsed the re-emergence of 
individual household business during the Third Plenum of the Communist Party's Eleventh 
^Morduch and Sicular (2000) study whether being a party member or a cadre increases a farmer's personal 
income, but they do not study political participation itself. 
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Central Committee.^ Despite ideological and other obstacles, from 1978 to 2001, China's 
private businesses grew from zero to over 38 million firms employing 160 million people and 
producing more than one third of China's industrial output. The growth rate of the private 
sector has far outpaced that of the public sector since its revival. 
In spite of the speed with which the private sector developed after 1978, the path was 
by no means free of obstructions. Although private businesses were accorded a measure 
of political recognition when they resurfaced in 1978,® they were not allowed to hire more 
than eight employees. This rule remained in place until ten years later, when the National 
People's Congress authorized the establishment of private enterprises with more than eight 
employees.7 In the 15 years following the beginning of the reform, private firms were con-
sidered an inferior ownership form for ideological reasons. Despite the existence of formal 
legislation permitting it, the overall political environment was antagonistic towards private 
business in the early years of reform (Young, 1989). Private entrepreneurs had to deal with 
hostility and social prejudice on the part of cadres and people in general who regarded them 
as dubious, ignoble, or even despicable. Challenges to the legitimacy of private business 
also came in the form of various political movements, e.g., periodic campaigns against spir-
itual pollution in 1983-1984, against bourgeois liberalization in 1987, and other movements 
cracking down on private businesses on the plea of "rectifying the market" and "attacking 
speculation," to name a few. Until the early 1990s, private entrepreneurs were carefully 
controlled and denied entrance into the political establishment. 
Ideology has become less important since the early 1990s. At the Fourteenth Party 
Congress held in 1992, the government attempted to raise the image of the private sector 
by discarding ownership discrimination and acknowledging the important role played by 
the private sector in China's social and economic development. This was followed by the 
4When the Communist Party won the civil war and founded the People's Republic of China in 1949，it 
began the socialist transformation of private businesses. Between 1952 and 1977, private businesses were 
completely banned in China. 
5See Young (1995) for a comprehensive description of the development of the private sector in China 
since 1978. 
®They were presented as peripheral in the Constitution of 1978, considered "a marginal sector to be 
tolerated temporarily and tightly controlled" (Young, 1995; pp. 14). 
^An edict titled "Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Private Enterprises" was 
issued in June 1988. See the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), June 29，1988. 
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lifting of various restrictions on private business (Sabin, 1994). Indeed, even before this 
formal endorsement of the private economy, four private business owners from Shenzhen, the 
city from which most of China's reforms started, became members of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference at the national and local levels, and another two became 
members of the local People's Congress in 1991,® symbolizing the loosening of the ideological 
concerns that had dogged private sector development throughout the 1980s. 
However, the economic environment in China remains far from perfect for private busi-
nesses. The official document from the same party congress also stated that the government 
should create fair market conditions, under which firms characterized by different types of 
ownership structures can compete fairly with each other. However, there is still a long way 
to go before the market environment in China becomes truly fair for private firms. The gov-
ernment still controls much of the resources; the state owned enterprises enjoy preferential 
status in obtaining bank loans and in other key inputs (Che, 2002; Brandt and Li, 2003); pri-
vate businesses are subject to arbitrary harassment by government officials (Pearson, 1997); 
and commercial and property laws are either non-existent or are not enforceable (McMillan, 
1995). 
Given the adverse political and economic environment and the discrimination suffered 
by the private sector, private entrepreneurs have been finding new ways to make their op-
eration easier. In the early 1990s, many private businesses chose the somewhat expedient 
strategy of "wearing a red hat", that it, they registered themselves as "collective enterprises" 
(Pearson, 1997; Che and Qian, 1998; Gore, 1998).® The disguise of "collective ownership" 
not only made these firms ideologically acceptable, it also won them material advantages 
like favorable tax treatment and better access to credit and other resources (Nee, 1992; 
Naught on, 1994). Since the loosening of ideological and political constraints in the 1990s, 
many of these private entrepreneurs have sought a new and even more powerful "red hat", 
i.e., they have been choosing to actively participate in politics. In particular, more and 
8See Pearson (1997), pp.111. A further twenty-one entrepreneurs were chosen to attend the March 1993 
meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference ("Private business to play a bigger role"， 
China Daily, Oct 21，1992). 
®Also see Garnaut et al. (2001)，pp. 46, Box 4.1 for an example. 
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more entrepreneurs are becoming members of the two powerful political bodies, the People's 
Congress (PC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). We 
introduce these next. 
2.2 P C and C P P C C 
The People's Congress is China's legislature, which, as stipulated by the Chinese Consti-
tution, is the highest organ of state power in China. Following the party and government 
hierarchies, there is a PC at each administrative level, including the central, provincial, 
municipal, county and township levels. Local PCs have the power to elect chief officials at 
their own administrative levels, to draft and approve local laws and policies, and to impeach 
government officials when necessary. The PC at the central level, or the National People's 
Congress (NPC), is considered the highest organ of state power of the People's Republic of 
China. Its main functions and powers include making laws and policies and electing top 
government officials in the central government. Theoretically, the PCs at all levels are in-
stituted through elections, but the party and government officials still control the process 
of candidate nomination. Thus, it is not surprising that all major party and government 
officials are deputies of the PC at the local/central level. 
The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is an advisory body to the 
party/government in China, somewhat analogous to an advisory legislative upper house. The 
main functions of the CPPCC are to hold political consultations and to exercise democratic 
supervision of the party and governments. Political consultation is held on major political, 
economic, cultural and social policies, both before decisions are made and in the process 
of their implementation. By making proposals and criticisms at regular meetings with the 
party and government officials, the CPPCC exercises its function of democratic supervision 
over the enforcement of China's Constitution, laws and regulations, the implementation of 
the major policies and the performance of government departments and their employees. 
When a CPPCC member makes a proposal, the government is committed to responding to 
it within a certain time.io 
lOpor example, a private firm owner and also a member of the CPPCC Zhejiang Provincial Committee 
in 1996 successfully introduced proposals for simplifying the authorization procedures for private projects, 
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Although the party/government still has tight control over the CPPCC, it is more 
independent from the party/government than is the PC. Although CPPCC nominees on 
the preliminary list need to survive the screening process by the party to get on the final 
slate, all social and economic organizations are allowed to nominate their own candidates. 
Because of the special mechanism for selecting CPPCC members, it has a much smaller party 
representation than the PC and its members come from more diversified backgrounds, many 
of them being members of the social, cultural, and business elite. The average education 
level of CPPCC members is much higher than that of PC members. 
3 Hypotheses 
Before discussing hypotheses, we first define private entrepreneurs and political participation. 
In this thesis, we refer to owners of private firms as private entrepreneurs. We refer to the 
securing of membership in the PC/CPPCC as political participation. 
In this section, we begin by describing four major institutional difficulties faced by 
private businesses in transition countries. We then summarize several responses with which 
private businesses seek to deal with these difficulties. These responses have been well studied 
in the literature. Finally, and more importantly, we argue that political participation of 
private entrepreneurs can serve as an institutional response that overcomes these difficulties. 
Based on these arguments, we develop hypotheses regarding the determinants of political 
participation of private entrepreneurs in China. 
Transition countries are characterized by posing several institutional difficulties for 
private businesses. Firstly, one of the most important difficulties is market failure, especially 
in the early stage of transition (McMillan, 1997). The governments in these countries usually 
possess monopolistic control over input and product markets (Chang and Wang, 1994). Many 
key resources such as power and raw materials are monopolized by state-owned enterprises, 
making them very difficult for private firms to obtain (Li, 1996). Another key input, credit, 
is also tightly controlled by state-owned banks, which private firms find it hard to access 
appeals for non-discriminatory treatment in extending credit, and legal protection of the property rights of 
private businesses (Heberer, 2003，pp. 218). 
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(Brandt and Li, 2003). Even when the markets become more developed as the transition 
process evolves, market failure may still substantially affect private businesses. 
Secondly, excessive regulatory burdens, known as red tape, have been widely observed 
in transition economies (De Soto, 1989; Brunetti et al.，1997; Guriev, 2004). The various 
forms of red tape imposed on entrepreneurs include unnecessary official routines, complex 
rules, and extended procedures that result in delays. Self-interested bureaucrats usually have 
discretion over the nature and amount of harassment meted out to private businesses, and 
they can use this power to extort bribes. Many government offices have the power to fine a 
firm or even terminate its production. For example, a fire inspector or a sanitary inspector 
can go to a firm to pick up on problems from time to time.n Business activities in China 
have been notoriously hampered by the stringent system of "Administrative Examination 
and Approval." Anecdotes abound about private start-ups taking years to get through the 
lengthy procedures required to obtain a business license or permit.^^ Firms waste consider-
able amounts of management time and resources steering through the bureaucracy. These 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs borne by firms present a major hindrance to business 
practice. 
Thirdly, heavy formal and informal tax is another feature of transition. Johnson et al. 
(2000) find that in Russia and Ukraine, the effective tax rates reported by respondents in 
their survey are formidably high. Government officials in these countries have been depicted 
as grabbing hands, preying on private businesses (Prye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer, 1997; 
Gelb et al., 1998; Levin and Satarov, 2000). Although the formal tax rate is uniform across 
localities in China, informal taxes and fees differ dramatically across localities (Wong, 1998). 
To fulfill the fiscal revenue target, to maintain public facilities and to pay their own wages, 
local government officials in China engage in fee collection and fund-raising activities of 
n i t was reported by Xinhua News Agency on September 8, 2002 that in Hengyang, Hunan Province, a 
drink producing firm was on the verge of shutdown only within half a month of its opening. The major cause 
was that several regulatory agencies inspected the firm for no reason. Because the entrepreneur refused to 
pay some "relational fees" he had a heavy fine imposed on him. Later, officials withheld his production 
certificates and even held him in custody. 
For example, in Jinhua County of Zhejiang Province, a farmer wanted to set up a chicken farm. He 
spent two years running from one office to the other and collected over 270 official stamps. When he was 
finally given a business licence, the optimal time for his planned investment had already passed (People's 
Daily {Renmin Ribao), August 28，2003). 
8 
various names as a complement to formal taxes. A large portion of these fees, charges and 
fund-raising methods are erratic, and in many cases unauthorized or even illegal (Fan, 1998). 
Finally, transition countries also lack a sound legal system, which is critical for property 
rights protection and contract enforcement (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a ； Johnson et al.， 
2002). In China's case, the pace of legal reform lags far behind its economic reform (Clarke, 
1996). Basically, the transition took place in an environment lacking the rule of law to 
prevent the government from encroaching on private enterprises (Che and Qian, 1998). The 
legal framework also plays only a limited role in contract enforcement, where bureaucrats 
adjudicate most disputes (Walder, 1995). 
In response to these state and market failures, firms in transition countries have been 
relying on other institutions to support their operations. It has been documented that 
firms in Russia, Ukraine and Eastern European countries choose to take their operations 
underground to elude high taxes and the “grabbing hand" of the government, and to escape 
from excessive bureaucracy (Johnson et al., 1997 and 2000; Friedman et al., 2000). Several 
empirical works provide cross-country evidence that the size of the unofficial economy is 
positively correlated with measures of over-regulation and heavy taxes (Johnson et al, 1998; 
Friedman et al, 2000). 
Firms may also rely on ad hoc substitutes for the missing formal institutions. In 
particular, firms may build their own institutions, also known as "self-help" (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002). For example, in the absence of laws for the enforcement of contracts, firms 
in Vietnam rely heavily on inter-firm relationships to make deals. Also in Viet man, firms 
depend on informal credits from suppliers when they have limited access to formal financial 
markets (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a). In Russia, private mechanisms such as arbitration 
are used instead of courts to resolve disputes (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). Firms may also pay 
mafias for private protection. Frye and Zhuravskaia (2000) and Sonin (2003) find that weak 
legal institutions drive private businesses to hire racketeers as private suppliers of protection. 
In response to the lack of market-supporting institutions, Chinese local governments 
13As such, private firms usually face unfavorable treatment when they engage in disputes with State Owned 
Enterprises, which are part of the political hierarchy and have close ties with the government (Bai et al., 
2003). 
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themselves become involved in business operations. In the 1980，s, township-village enter-
prises (TVEs) flourished as a highly distinctive form of local government ownership. Pre-
vious studies on Chinese TVEs have shown that local governments have been instrumental 
in the success of these non-state firms by providing them with crucial inputs, such as land 
and credit where factor markets were underdeveloped and prices of inputs were tightly con-
trolled (Chang and Wang, 1994; Naughton, 1994; Putterman, 1997; Che and Qian, 1998). 
Nee (1992) contends that local governments contribute substantially to the growth of TVEs 
by utilizing political ties to expand these firms' market reach. Local government ownership 
also protects TVEs from being interfered with by government at higher levels (Che and 
Qian, 1998). Jin and Qian (1998) find empirical evidence that the development of TVEs in 
a locality is negatively correlated with its market development. 
Entrepreneurs may also actively participate in politics to reduce the costs associated 
with market, state and legal failures. In this thesis, we argue that rather than operating 
unofficially or establishing self-help among peers, many competent Chinese entrepreneurs 
make a very different choice, namely, to participate in politics to overcome the lack of 
formal institutions to support their business operations. More specifically, entrepreneurs 
may participate in politics by obtaining membership of the PC or CPPCC. 
Membership in the PC or CPPCC helps to overcome state/market failures. In areas 
where markets are underdeveloped, private firms cannot completely count on the market 
mechanism to do business. As with the distinctive ownership form of TVEs, support from 
the government or government officials can also be valuable to private entrepreneurs. Since 
entrepreneurs in the PC/CPPCC have many opportunities to interact with government offi-
cials, and since government officials for their part also need political support from the political 
bodies, a PC/CPPCC membership can make it easy for entrepreneurs to cultivate a close 
relationship with government officials. These privileged entrepreneurs may well draw on such 
ties to facilitate their business operation. In areas where state economies dominate, member-
ship may reduce ideological discrimination from government or other regulatory agencies. 
Being friends of officials and having some political power themselves, PC/CPPCC mem-
10 
bers can effectively shield themselves against state encroachment when local governments 
act as "grabbing hand.”i4 PC/CPPCC members may also enjoy other forms of preferential 
treatment from governmental agencies that would not be possible for other private firms.^^ 
Finally, certain political arrangements in the polity may lower the cost of settlement of dis-
putes where legal instruments are inadequate or law enforcement is weak. The reputation 
effect also benefits these entrepreneurs in making and enforcing contracts. The above argu-
ments lead to Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Private entrepreneurs whose firms are located in provinces with weaker 
markets or market-supporting institutions are more likely to engage in political participation. 
Specifically, political participation is more likely, when the market is less developed, when the 
local government has more regulation, when the informal tax burden is heavier, and when 
the legal system is weaker. 
Political participation is not without cost. The most important cost is time. According 
to the law, PC members are required to attend at least the annual meeting lasting two to ten 
days, and they have to attend many other ad hoc meetings. Moreover, PC members in some 
localities have to participate in the activities organized by the local PC for at least 15 days 
a yea r . 16 These meetings impose a huge time cost on the already very busy entrepreneurs. 
Although political campaigns are prohibited in China, some entrepreneurs lobby for candi-
dacy or membership in the PC/CPPCC, and this also involves time and pecuniary costs.i7 
These costs notwithstanding, entrepreneurs may still choose to participate in the PC and 
CPPCC because the costs are outweighed by the much larger benefits, especially in places 
14According to an article in the China News Week {Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan, No.9，2001)，regulatory 
agencies are afraid of overcharging P C / C P P C C members because they could raise issues of overcharging to 
higher level government officials at regular meetings. 
ispor instance, as reported by Xinhua News Agency on August 21, 2001, a private decoration firm owner 
in Yuncheng City, Shanxi Province claimed that it would be easier for him to take projects in this city if he 
had been elected to the People's Congress at the municipal level. 
i6See Newsletters of Hainan People's Congress (Hainan Renda), Issue 8，2001. 
i7ln a handful of extreme cases, private entrepreneurs bribe government officials and constituents in 
order to be elected as members of the PC. For example, in Linfen City, Shanxi Province, several private 
entrepreneurs were found to have paid bribes to be elected to the People's Congress at the municipal level 
(China News Week {Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan), No.9, 2001). 
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where market-supporting institutions are weak. 
Along with the external institutional environment, the characteristics of the entrepreneurs 
and their firms are also important determinants of their political participation behavior. In 
this thesis, we focus on two sets of characteristics, i.e., those representing their political 
capital and those representing their human capital. 
Entrepreneurs may develop their political capital through their interactions with the 
party and government. The Communist Party of China still maintains a very strong in-
fluence over the legislature, largely by being able to recommend candidates, to control the 
extensive screening process, and even to determine the membership of the PCs at various 
levels. In selecting the PC members, political reliability (conformity) and personal relation-
ship play a very important role. Party members and managers of former public firms (State 
Owned Enterprises or Township-Village Enterprises) have a natural advantage in terms of 
their perceived reliability. They have already established their position in the bureaucratic 
system, because only politically reliable people can join the party or become public firm man-
agers. Party members and former public firm managers may also have cultivated personal 
relationships through their numerous interactions with the party/government leaders. They 
also have an information advantage, having developed formal and informal communication 
channels with party/government officials and because officials know their qualifications bet-
ter than those of other entrepreneurs. Thus we expect that entrepreneurs who are party 
members or/and former public firm managers are more likely to attain membership of the 
People's Congress at various levels. However, being a party member or a former public firm 
manager may not be sufficient to secure membership in the CPPCC, over which the party 
has less control. 
Political capital may also be correlated with firm size and history. Large firm size can 
usually be translated into more resources, greater control over labor, stronger economic im-
pact on the local community and therefore more bargaining power with the state (Hellman et 
al., 2003). Thus we expect that large firm size potentially contributes to the political success 
of the firm's owner. Managers can also wield greater influence if their firms have operated 
12 
in the locality for a longer period, since close ties with the state cannot be cultivated within 
a short timescale. To summarize, we state the second hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: An entrepreneur's likelihood of political participation increases with his/her 
political capital In particular, it is more likely when the entrepreneur is a party member 
and/or a former public firm manager, and when the firm is larger and/or has a longer 
history. 
Finally, the entrepreneur's political participation behavior may also depend on his/her 
human capital. We expect that general human capital variables such as age, schooling and 
birth place contribute to the likelihood of political participation. This is summarized as our 
third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The entrepreneur's political participatory behavior depends positively on 
his/her human capital. 
4 Data and Variables 
The data used in this study come from two sources: the nation-wide survey of privately-
owned enterprises and the provincial-level institutional indices. The survey of privately-
owned enterprises was conducted jointly by the All China Industry and Commerce Feder-
ation, the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
and the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee, the Communist Party 
of China in 2002. The sample contains mainly large firms with a small portion of individual 
household businesses drawn from 31 provinces covering all political subdivisions at this level 
in Mainland China,^^ and therefore generate enough variation in local institutional settings. 
This feature allows us to investigate how Chinese entrepreneurs respond to the institutional 
heterogeneity across provinces, especially in their political participatory behaviors. 
The dataset is by far the best one for studying the political participation of private 
i®The average size of our sample is 169.4 employees, which is much larger than the national average of 
11.4 (YICAC, 2003). 
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business owners in China. In total, we have 3,258 privately owned enterprises and indi-
vidual household businesses, representing 0.16 percent of the total privately-owned firms 
and businesses nationwide. The survey involves an intensive interview of the firm owner, 
with questions covering many aspects of the firm including the firm's size, history and basic 
financial information, as well as the firm owner's family background, human capital and 
occupational history. ^ ^ Most importantly, the survey contains information on the owners' 
political participatory behavior, such as membership of the party and the PC or CPPCC. 
A primary analysis of the data shows that private business owners actively participate 
in politics (Table 1). Out of the 3,258 business owners, 17 percent possess membership in 
the PC at various levels, and 35 percent are members of the CPPCC.Moreover , about 30 
percent of the entrepreneurs are party members and, not surprisingly, most of these joined 
the Party before they started their own businesses. 
In our dataset, the firm owners' work experience is reported in great detail. On average, 
the entrepreneurs in our data have more than 10 years' management experience (Table 1). 
More than one third are former employees in state-owned or collective enterprises. The firms 
in our sample come from diversified industrial sectors, from farming to technical services. 
Their sizes range from individual household businesses to large scale enterprises with up to 
4,000 employees.21 
In addition to the firm survey data, we also make use of the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization (IM) of China's provinces in 2001 to measure the 
i9See Table Al for a detailed description of variables. 
20Anecdotal evidence shows that the percentage of PC and CPPCC members among private entrepreneurs 
does not normally exceed 10 percent. For example, in 1996 in Fuyang City, Anhui Province, 6.6 percent 
of the private entrepreneurs were members of either the PC or CPPCC at various levels (Heberer, 2003; 
pp. 217). The percentage in our sample is high because the firms are, on average, 14 times larger than the 
average firm size in the country as a whole and, as we will show in the empirical work, the likelihood of 
political participation increases with firm size. For instance, at least 63 percent of the Forbes richest 100 
Chinese entrepreneurs, who are owners of the largest private firms in China, are PC/CPPCC members at 
the central or provincial levels. 
^^Additional attention should be paid to the employment variable. We use employment, or the number 
of persons employed, to measure a firm's size. One difficulty is that some labor contracts are effective for 
only one year or even less. Some temporary employees do not have formal contracts. Thus we measure 
the employment of a firm with a weighted average of workers or staff with different employment durations. 
Workers employed all year round are given full weight, namely one. Employees hired for less than one year 
but more than 6 months have a weighting of 0.5. Those employed for less than 6 months have a weighting 
of 0.25. 
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quality of market-supporting institutions at the provincial level.22 The NERI indices capture 
the progress of institutional transition in China's 30 provinces (excluding Tibet, due to the 
lack of data). Appraisals of the regional institutions are made in several dimensions, namely 
the relationship between the government and the market, the development of the non-state 
sector, the development of the markets, the development of market intermediaries and the 
legal environment. See Appendix 1 and Table A2 for a detailed description of all indices. 
To test Hypothesis 1, we use several indices of marketization to measure institutional 
heterogeneity across regions. First, we use a sub-index which scores the percentage of com-
modity prices determined by the market mechanism. The higher this ratio, the more market-
oriented is the allocation mechanism in the province. The development of the financial mar-
ket is measured by the percentage of deposits taken by non-state financial institutions and 
the percentage of short-term loans to the non-state sector. Second, we make use of the index 
named "the government's excessive administrative intervention in enterprises" as a proxy 
for the intensity of over-regulation in a province. In surveys commissioned by the Chinese 
Entrepreneurs Survey System, enterprise managers were asked to rank the relative impor-
tance of interactions with governments and other public agencies in their routine work. The 
index draws on this data to compute the provincial level of bureaucratic red tape, for which 
a lower score implies more over-regulation. Third, to measure the relative severity of govern-
ment predation, we draw on a sub-index named "enterprises' extra-tax financial burdens." 
It is calculated based on the enterprises' financial burdens other than on official taxes as a 
percentage of sales from the Survey System. Finally, we apply the sub-index corresponding 
to the number of lawyers as a percentage of the population in a province as a measure of 
the legal environment. A higher ratio usually implies a higher faith in the rule of law and 
therefore more extensive use of legal instruments in dispute resolution. 
The aforementioned data sources contain three sets of independent variables that we 
use in our empirical analysis, namely the human capital, political capital and institutional 
indices. The human capital measures include the entrepreneur's age, education, years of 
22The NERI Index project was sponsored by the National Economic Research Institute and the China 
Reform Foundation and conducted by Fan et al. (2003). 
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management experience and whether he/she has a rural origin. The political capital measures 
include variables indicating whether the entrepreneur is a party member and/or a former 
public firm manager, and the firm's age and total employment. Finally, we use a set of 
institutional indices to measure the development of product and credit market, government 
regulations, the informal tax burden and the legal system, with larger values of these indexes 
indicating better institutions. 
5 Econometric Specification 
Our objective in this study is to examine the underlying determinants of private entrepreneurs' 
political participation behavior. Since there is no natural ordering of the participation choices 
(namely, PC, CPPCC and neither), we apply the multinomial logit model to estimate the 
likelihood of private entrepreneurs' political participation. 
The multinomial logit model is specified as follows. Let Pij be the probability of 
entrepreneur i choosing option j, where j equals 0 if i does not participate in politics, equals 
1 if z is a member of the PC and equals 2 if i is a member of the CPPCC. Let Xi denote 
variables measuring the quality of institutional environments, and the entrepreneur's political 
and human capital. The probability Pij is then given as: 
1 
Pio = -~-T 
1 + E L i e卢… 
TJAA ； ~ f o r 7 = 1 , 2 
Here, the group of entrepreneurs that are neither PC nor CPPCC members (the non-
participation group) are chosen as the base category for comparison. 
Using the non-participants as the base group, we derive the the log-odd ratios,^^ defined 
as 
In = for j = 1,2 
230dds ratio is also known as the relative risk ratio. The odds ratio measures how likely participation in 
the PC or CPPCC is relative to the base category, i.e., non-participation. In the multinomial logit model, 
the log of odds ratio is a linear function of the independent variables. 
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Thus, we will report the estimated coefficients, i.e., 0j , which affect the log-odd ratios in a 
linear way. 
6 Empirical Results 
This section systematically tests our hypotheses using the data described above. We apply a 
simple conditional probability analysis followed by the formal analysis using the multinomial 
logit model. 
6.1 Conditional Probability Analysis of Political Participation 
Before the regression analysis, we first use a conditional probability analysis to examine the 
correlation between the likelihood of political participation and the potential determinants. 
For now, we do not distinguish between membership in the PC and membership in the 
CPPCC, and only examine how the probability of political participation (in either the PC 
or CPPCC) varies with these potential determinants. 
Table 2 shows that the probability of political participation rises with the general 
human capital and political capital variables. Participation is more likely when entrepreneurs 
are older (0.40 vs. 0.53) and more experienced (0.39 vs. 0.55). However, entrepreneurs with 
more education have almost no advantage in political participation (0.46 vs. 0.47). Moreover, 
party members are more likely to participate in the PC/CPPCC (0.46 vs. 0.55). Similarly, 
previous work experience as a public firm manager also raises the probability of political 
participation from 0.45 to 0.54. Further, an entrepreneur is more likely to participate if 
his/her firm has a longer history (0.39 vs. 0.54) or a larger size (0.35 vs. 0.58). 
More importantly, political participation is more likely for entrepreneurs doing business 
in a province where markets or market-supporting institutions are less developed. The 
underdevelopment of product markets raises the probability of participation from 0.43 to 
0.53, whereas the underdevelopment of the credit markets raises the probability from 0.43 to 
0.56. Table 2 also shows that entrepreneurs in a province where local governments have more 
regulations are more likely to participate in politics (0.43 vs. 0.58). Correspondingly, those 
in a province where the legal system is weaker are more likely to participate (0.44 vs. 0.55). 
17 
However, a higher level of informal tax burden alone does not increase an entrepreneur's 
likelihood of political participation. 
In general, this simple tabulation shows that the political capital, human capital and 
institutional indices are indeed correlated with political participation as expected. However, 
we do not know whether these associations are statistically significant. Neither do we know 
whether participation in the PC differs from participation in the CPPCC in terms of its 
associations with these variables. We therefore turn to the formal regression analysis. 
6.2 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Political Participation 
We start the analysis with a baseline regression, which tests only Hypothesis 3, or the effect 
of human capital variables such as the entrepreneur's age, education, years of management 
experience, and whether he has a rural origin as independent variables. We then add the 
political capital and institutional variables into the analysis. In all regressions, we control 
for plausible heterogeneity across industries using a set of industrial indicators. 
Our baseline analysis shows that human capital indeed matters for political partici-
pation of entrepreneurs, but its role differs for PC membership as compared with CPPCC 
membership (model (1) of Table 3). The coefficients pertaining to the firm owner's human 
capital are all positive and significant at least at the five percent level. An entrepreneur who 
is older, more educated, and with more management experience is more likely to be a mem-
ber of either the PC or the CPPCC. These findings suggest that both political organizations 
emphasize good human capital in selecting their members. Comparing the coefficients on 
education in the two columns, we find that education plays a more important role in CPPCC 
membership than in PC membership, the former having a coefficient almost double that of 
the latter, which again shows that the CPPCC places more emphasis on the education level 
of its members. The results also show that entrepreneurs with a rural origin have a higher 
likelihood of participating in the PC but not in CPPCC, probably reflecting the fact that 
the PC more evenly represents the population, the majority of which are from rural areas. 
In model (2) of Table 3, we add personal political capital variables, i.e., party member-
ship and public firm management experience as independent variables. The regression shows 
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that party members and former public managers are more likely to be members of the PC, 
but may not have an advantage in obtaining membership of the CPPCC. The party member 
and former public firm manager dummies have positive coefficients in both columns 3 and 
4, but they are significant only for PC membership. Moreover, with these new independent 
variables added, coefficients of human capital variables attenuate in column 3. The education 
variable even becomes less significant in contributing to the likelihood of PC membership, 
which confirms our earlier conjecture that the PC cares less about the education level of its 
members. 
In model (3) of Table 3, we include the firm's attributes, namely the firm's age and 
employment (in natural logarithm), as independent variables. The regression shows that 
owners of older firms are more likely to participate in politics, since the coefficients of firm 
age are significant at the five percent level in both columns. The regression also shows that 
owners of larger firms are more likely to be members of the PC or CPPCC. The coefficients 
measuring the firm's size are significant at the one percent level in both columns of model 
(3). An increase in a firm's size by one percent will increase the odds ratio of being a PC 
member relative to non-participation by 0.58, and increase the odds ratio of being a CPPCC 
member relative to non-participation by 0.33. 
In general, the regressions in Table 3 show that the likelihood of political participa-
tion increases with the entrepreneurs' political and human capital. However, some of these 
variables differ in their effects on PC as against CPPCC membership. While education is 
important in determining the likelihood of being a CPPCC member, it has no effect on the 
likelihood of being in the PC. By contrast, being a party member or former public firm 
manager only helps an entrepreneur in obtaining membership of the PC, not of the CPPCC. 
We next test the main hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, i.e., political participation is shaped by 
the institutional environments in which entrepreneurs operate their businesses. Regression 
results indeed show that entrepreneurs are more likely to participate in politics when the 
institutional environments they are situated in are more hostile. 
In models (4)-(6) in Table 4，we test whether the development of markets has an ef-
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feet on political participation. The results show that private entrepreneurs are more likely 
to participate in politics when the market, especially the credit market, is more underde-
veloped. To avoid multicollinearity, we first employ one market index at a time, i.e., the 
product market and the credit market respectively in models (4) and (5) in examining the 
entrepreneurs' response to the development of different markets. The coefficients pertaining 
to the market indices are all negative as we expected. The coefficients of the product market 
index are significant only regarding participation in the CPPCC, while the coefficients of the 
credit market index are significant for participation in both the CPPCC and PC. Moreover, 
the coefficients on the credit market index are overall larger than the product market index. 
In model (6), we include both market indices. The results continue to show that the 
credit market plays a more important role in shaping the entrepreneur's political participa-
tion behavior. The coefficients on the credit market index are negative and significant at the 
one percent level in both columns. However, the coefficients on the product market indices 
turn positive, although insignificant. This is probably due to the high correlation between 
these market indices, suggesting that the product market has picked up some effects of the 
credit market in model (5). These results, together with the findings from models (4) and 
(5) provide some evidence showing that the underdevelopment of the credit market could be 
a more important reason for private entrepreneurs to participate in politics. 
We interpret the different effects of the product market and credit market in the follow-
ing ways. First, the product market is generally more developed and has a larger provincial 
variation than the credit market. The average development index for the product market is 
7.88, versus 5.93 for that of the credit market, whereas the standard deviation of the product 
market index is smaller (1.70 vs. 2.02). These values show that, relative to the mean, the 
relative variation in the development of the credit market is much larger than that of the 
product market. The lower development level together with a larger variation means that 
the credit market is a more important explanatory variable. Second, the product market is 
more open and unified than the credit market in China. Since the 2002 sample does not 
contain information on the major market destinations of firms, we make use of the 2000 
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sample, which contains such information. Most (68 percent) of the firms in the 2000 sample 
sold their products to provinces other than the home province, and 34 percent exported. 
Considering the fact that many entrepreneurs do not confine their businesses within their 
home provinces, the development of the product market in their home provinces is not that 
important. On the other hand, firms normally get their credits from their home cities or 
provinces. In China, the credit markets are monopolized by four gigantic state-owned com-
mercial banks, which have established branches at each administrative level. The locations 
of bank branches parallel the territory structure of the government system, and the scope 
of business is designed to minimize overlapping and competition within the same institu-
tion. Normally, bank branches are not allowed to lend beyond their own area. Thus, the 
credit-market is more province-specific for a firm, and is more important in affecting political 
participation. 
We next test whether over-regulation, heavy tax burden, and weak legal environment 
also have an effect on political participation. Regression results reported in Table 5 show 
that most of these factors are important in shaping Chinese entrepreneurs' political partici-
pation behavior. Models (7)-(9) are three regressions, each of which has one of these three 
institutional indices. The coefficients on all three indices are negative. The coefficients on 
over-regulation and legal environment are significant at the one percent level, while those on 
tax burden are not significant. This provides some support to Hypothesis 1, which states that 
entrepreneurs in provinces with more regulatory burden and weaker legal enforcement are 
more likely to participate in politics. However, the effects of tax burdens are less significant, 
as regressions indicate. 
In the last two columns in Table 5，we include all three institutional indices together 
with the credit market index, which is shown to be an important determinant. Even though 
including all indices may reduce their individual explaining power due to multicollinearity, 
the regression results continue to support Hypothesis 1. The credit market and legal envi-
ronment indices are negative and significant at the one percent level. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients for these two indices are also similar to previous results. Over-regulation contin-
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ues to have a negative effect on participation in the CPPCC, but not on participation in the 
PC. The coefficients of the tax burden measure remain negative and even become significant 
at the five percent level for the likelihood of being a CPPCC member as we control for other 
indices. 
7 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we employ a unique matched firm-institution dataset to test several hypotheses 
regarding the underlying determinants of political participation of private entrepreneurs in 
China. Our empirical work shows that the likelihood of an entrepreneur's participation 
can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets, especially the credit market, and 
imperfections of market-supporting institutions, including excessive government regulation, 
informal tax burdens and a weak legal system. Our findings support the view that the 
institutional environment shapes private entrepreneurs' motivation to participate in politics. 
We also find that the likelihood of an entrepreneur's participation is determined by both 
his/her human capital and political capital. 
Our study provides another example of how private entrepreneurs respond to the im-
perfect markets and market-supporting institutions in transition countries. As with other 
responses such as hiding, self-help or government ownership, participating in politics can 
make entrepreneurs' own business operations easier. Unlike these responses, which are rather 
passive, political participation is apparently a more assertive response. By participating in 
politics, entrepreneurs as a group can have a far-reaching impact on the development of 
policy and law in these countries. Already, in China, their collective actions have led to 
some critical changes. Since 1998, private entrepreneurs have submitted numerous proposals 
to the NPC and CPPCC, requesting legal protection for private property rights.24 Their 
endeavors finally led to the constitutional amendment in 2004, which for the first time since 
the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 provides that the right to private 
property is inviolable (People's Daily {Remin Ribao) March 8, 2004). 
As economic and political reforms evolve in China, private entrepreneurs will certainly 
24See Southern Weekend {Nanfang Zhoumo), March 18, 2004. 
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play a more important role in every aspect of the country. Recognizing this, the sixteenth 
National Congress of the Communist Party amended the Constitution of the party, and for 
the first time openly allowed private entrepreneurs to join the communist party (Xinhua News 
Agency, November 18，2002), originally the party for poor workers and farmers. It remains 
to be seen how far this dramatic change in party policy will affect the political dynamics 
in China, but what has already been seen is that private entrepreneurs have become an 
indispensable power in today's China. Their presence in politics will not only further enhance 
the business environment in China but will also contribute to the fundamental transformation 
of the economic and political ecology in China, a subject which deserves further research. 
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Appendix 1: Institutional Indices 
Each of the five principal indices comprises several sub-indices. In total there are 25 sub-
indices measuring 25 different dimensions of institutions. These sub-indices are computed 
using data from several sources. To get a single sub-index, the authors first give a score to 
each province according to some objective measures, such as the ratio of budgetary expenses 
to provincial GDP, the ratio of the non-state sector to gross industrial output, and the ra-
tio of lawyers to the provincial population. These measures are obtained from statistical 
yearbooks or survey data.^^ These scores are then normalized to a value between 0 and 10 
proportionately, with larger values indicating better market-supporting institutions. Indi-
cators beyond the base year (1999) are relaxed from the "0-10" restriction so as to better 
reflect the continued advance of marketization over time. Thus, these sub-indices essen-
tially measure 25 fine aspects of each provincial institutional environment relative to other 
provinces. The five principal indices are weighted averages of sub-indices for each of the five 
categories. The Principle Components Analysis approach is adopted to assign component 
weights in order to avoid any subjective bias. 
25Tlie data in the NERI Index project mainly come from the statistical yearbooks of the National Statistics 
Bureau, which contain statistical information about prices and the administration of industry and commerce, 
the courts, consumers' associations, as well as the government's statistical information from banks' surveys 
and the entrepreneur survey system, and survey information about rural households from the National 
Statistics Bureau. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N = 3258 ) 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Min Max 
Deviation 
Owner's attributes 
PC member 3258 0.17 0.38 0 1 
CPPCC member 3258 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Age 3221 43.9 8.1 22 76 
Education (years of schooling) 3258 13.00 3.07 0 19 
Years of management experience 3239 10.3 6.0 0 35 
Rural origin 3258 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Party Member 3225 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Former public firm manager 3258 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Firm's attributes 
Firm age 3158 6.0 4.3 0 28 
Employment (persons) 3207 169.38 316.98 1 4000 
Employment (natural log) 3207 4.23 1.33 0 8.29 
Institutional indices 
Product Market 3248 7.88 1.70 0 10 
Credit Market 3248 5.93 2.02 0.35 7.94 
Over-regulation 3248 7.43 2.39 0 10 
Informal tax burden 3248 5.43 1.97 0 10 
Legal environment 3248 3.67 3.25 0.11 11.81 
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Table 2: Probability of Political Participation of Private Entrepreneurs Conditional on Each of the 
independent variables (N=3258) 
Probability of participation (PC/CPPCC ) 
Independent variables Each independent variable Each independent variable 
less than or equal to median above median 
Human capital 
Age 0.40 0.53 
Education 0.46 0.47 
Years of management experience 0.39 0.55 
Rural origin 0.42 0.49 
Political capital 
Party member 0.46 0.55 
Former public firm manager 0.45 0.54 
Firm age 0.39 0.54 
Employment 0.35 0.58 
Institutional indices 
Product Market 0.53 0.43 
Credit Market 0.56 0.43 
Over-regulation 0.58 0.43 
Informal tax burden 0.44 0.52 
Legal environment 0.50 0.44 
a. The numbers in the table are the probabilities of an entrepreneur being a member of either the People's 
Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee. 
b. If the independent variable is a dummy variable, we divide it into two groups according to its two values, 
i.e., zero and one. 
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Table 3 ： Multinomial Logit Regressions Examining the Determinants of Political Participation of Private 
Entrepreneurs 
Dependent variable 
⑴ (2) (3) 
P C CPPCC P C CPPCC P C CPPCC 
Human capital 
Age 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 
(4.56) (3.92) (4.24) (3.61) (3.95) (3.72) 
Education 0.048*** 0.080*** 0.035* 0.080*** 0.000 0.062*** 
(2.69) (5.30) (1.92) (5.24) (0.01) (3.87) 
Experience 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 
(7.71) (9.61) (7.98) (9.59) (4.93) (5.11) 
Rural origin 0.570*** 0.152 0.524*** 0.139 0.557*** 0.184* 
(6.42) (1.64) (4.27) (1.50) (4.31) (1.89) 
Political capital 
Party Member 0.620*** 0.128 0.706*** 0.053 
(3.35) (0.71) (3.46) (0.27) 
Former public firm 0.574*** 0.018 0.506*** 0.042 
manager (4.92) (0.17) (4.07) (0.38) 
Employment (log) 0.581*** 0.326*** 
(12.38) (8.73) 
Firm age 0.034** 0.071 … 
(2.44) (6.16) 
Other control variables 
Sector indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.06 0.06 0.10 
LRChi-sqr-statistics 357.39*** 394.02*** 617.95*** 
Obs ^ ^ ^ 
a. Numbers in parentheses are z-ratios. 
b. Significance levels of 0.1，0.05 and 0.01 are noted by *, **, and ***. 
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Table 4 ： Multinomial Logit Regressions Examining the Determinants of Political Participation of Private 
Entrepreneurs 
Dependent variable 
(4) ⑶ （6) 
P C CPPCC P C CPPCC P C CPPCC 
Human capital 
Age 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 
(4.02) (3.78) (4.09) (3.89) (4.10) (3.89) 
Education -0.001 0.062*** -0.005 0.055*** -0.006 0.055*** 
(-0.03) (3.85) (-0.25) (3.40) (-0.28) (3.35) 
Experience 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 
(4.88) (5.18) (4.83) (5.10) (4.82) (5.09) 
Rural origin 0.545*** 0.182* 0.561*** 0.204** 0.573*** 0.215** 
(4.22) (1.86) (4.32) (2.06) (4.41) (2.17) 
Political capital 
Party Member 0.725*** 0.076 0.737*** 0.101 0.744*** 0.110 
(3.54) (0.38) (3.59) (0.51) (3.62) (0.55) 
Former public firm 0.513*** 0.040 0.543*** 0.080 0.542*** 0.081 
manager (4.12) (0.36) (4.34) (0.70) (4.33) (0.71) 
Employment (log) 0.586*** 0.329*** 0.575*** 0.308*** 0.570*** 0.303*** 
(12.43) (8.75) (12.15) (8.07) (12.03) (7.95) 
Firm age 0.034** 0.069*** 0.033** 0.068*** 0.034** 0.069*** 
(2.45) (6.01) (2.37) (5.87) (2.42) (5.92) 
Institutional indices 
Product Market -0.028 -0.073*** 0.055 0.045 
(-0.85) (-2.91) (1.49) (1.56) 
Credit Market -0.133*** -0.198*** -0.155*** -0.216*** 
(-4.69) (-8.89) (-4.86) (-8.57) 
Other control variables 
Sector indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.10 0.12 0.12 
LRChi-sqr-statistics 626.84*** 701.12*** 704.55*** 
Obs ^ ^ 3039 
a. Numbers in parentheses are z-ratios. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table Al: Definitions of Firm-Level Variables 
Variable name Definition 
Owner's attributes 
PC member 1 if a member of the PC at any level, 0 otherwise 
CPPCC member 1 if a member of the CPPCC at any level, 0 otherwise 
Education Yeas of schooling 
Rural origin 1 if bom in rural regions 
Party Member 1 if a Party Member, 0 otherwise 
Former public firm manager 1 if formerly served as manager in SOE or TVE 
Firm's attributes 
Firm age How many years ago the firm has come into existence 
Employment (persons) Number of persons employed. +1 for whole-year employment; + 
0.5 * for employment for less than one year but more than 6 
months; + 0.25 * for employment for less than 6 months. 
Other control variables 
Sector indicators 14 industry sector indicators 
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Table A2: Institutional Indices 
1 .Relationship between government and market 
la. proportion of economic resources allocated through market 
lb. tax and charge burden on farmers 
Ic. government's excessive administrative intervention in enterprises 
Id. enterprises' non-tax burden 
le. excessive size of government (overstaffmg) 
2.Development of the non-state sector 
2a. proportion of the non-state sector in gross industrial output 
2b. proportion of the non-state sector in national investment in fixed assets 
2c. proportion of the non-state sector in number of employed persons 
3. Development of the goods market 
3a. percentage of products with market-regulated prices 
3b. degree of local protectionism 
4. Development of the factor market 
4a. development of the financial market 
4b. degree of absorption of foreign investment 
4c. liquidity of the labor force 
4d. transactions of local technology market weighted by number of technicians 
5. Development of market intermediaries and the legal environment 
5a. development of market intermediaries (proportion of lawyers and accountants in the population) 
5b. protection of property rights 
5b 1. numbers of economic cases and consumer complaints for every 100 million yuan of GDP 
5b2. number of closed cases relative to number of cases handled - economic case 
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